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The United States use of “zeroing” in its antidumping 
procedures has become a political flash point threatening 
some legitimacy of the WTO’s dispute settlement 
system. This paper provides a positive analysis of the 
zeroing issue, explains how it has evolved and who is 
likely to be affected by it. The authors use economic 
theory to identify how export price volatility accentuates 
the impact of zeroing on the size of U.S. antidumping 
tariffs and review the WTO caseload over zeroing. They 
describe the impact that the U.S.’s retrospective system 
for assessing antidumping margins has on zeroing and 
the political economy implications as the U.S. struggles 
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to generate policy reform. The authors survey existing 
evidence of the impact of the zeroing on dumping 
margins and contribute their own evidence to suggest 
that zeroing is just as likely to impact the size of U.S. 
antidumping duties applied on developing country 
exports as developed economy exports. Thus while 
developed economies have filed the vast majority of 
WTO disputes against the U.S. over zeroing, the authors 
conclude that zeroing is also likely a relevant issue for 
developing country exporters as over 60 percent of the 
product lines currently subject to U.S. antidumping are 
exported by developing countries.U.S. Antidumping: 
Much Ado About Zeroing 
 
 
Chad P. Bown 
The World Bank† 
 
Thomas J. Prusa‡ 




                                            
† Bown: Development Research Group, Trade and Integration (DECTI); The World Bank, 1818 H Street, 
NW, MSN MC3-303, Washington, DC 20433 USA. Tel: +1.202.473.9588. Email: cbown@worldbank.org, 
Web: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/cbown  
‡ Prusa: Department of Economics, New Jersey Hall, 75 Hamilton Street, Rutgers University, New 
Brunswick, NJ 08901-1248, Tel: +1.732.917.0484. Email: prusa@econ.rutgers.edu, 
Web: http://econweb.rutgers.edu/prusa/  
The authors thank James Durling, Valerie Ellis and Edwin Vermulst for useful discussions. The paper also 
benefitted from useful comments by Will Martin, Petros Marvoidis, Niall Meagher, Mike Moore, William 
Nye, Hylke Vandenbussche and Deborah Winkler.  All remaining errors are our own.  Any opinions 
expressed in this paper are the authors’ and should not be attributed to the World Bank.  
– 1 – 1.  Introduction 
One of the Uruguay Round’s more notable achievements was the establishment of 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).  When the Uruguay Round 
negotiations were initiated in 1986 there was a growing consensus that the original GATT 
dispute settlement system was ineffective (Hudec, 1993).  Compliance was a key failing of 
the old system; GATT contracting countries either blocked or simply ignored the findings 
of Panels.1  This was particularly problematic and embarrassing for high profile trade 
disputes involving both the United States and the European Communities (EC), e.g., 
bananas, beef hormones, and even tuna-dolphin.  The failure to resolve these prominent 
disputes undermined the credibility of the GATT dispute process.  
Consequently, a dispute settlement process that improved on both the timeliness 
and enforceability of dispute decisions was one of the major goals of the Uruguay Round.  
In many respects the WTO DSU does represent a significant advance over the toothless 
GATT system.2  Yet, frustrations remain.  In theory the new system induces compliance 
by increasing the possibility that plaintiffs will obtain the right to levy compensatory/ 
retaliatory tariffs against defendants who do not adjust their policies. In reality, 
compliance has continued to be a problem on occasion.  Countries continue to argue about 
                                            
1 The need to produce consensus also affected how Panels constructed their rulings as the three 
panelists knew that their report had also to be accepted by the losing party in order to be adopted. 
Accordingly, there was an incentive to rule not solely on the basis of the legal merits of a complaint, but to 
aim for a “diplomatic” solution by crafting a compromise that would be acceptable to both sides. 
2 Hudec (1999) refers to increasingly legalized WTO dispute settlement as one of “jurist’s 
jurisprudence” when compared with the GATT system’s “diplomat’s jurisprudence” (Hudec, 1970). Jackson 
(1997) and Hoekman and Kostecki (2009, chapter 5) also provide useful discussions of the evolution of the 
GATT and WTO dispute systems. Bown (2009) emphasizes the implications of WTO dispute settlement for 
developing countries. 
– 2 – what constitutes compliance and half measures can delay even “compensatory” tariffs for 
years.3   
While the GATT dispute system was damaged by its failure in highly prominent 
cases, the shortcomings of WTO DSU are most apparent in a series of seemingly minor 
disputes involving the esoteric practice of zeroing in antidumping (AD) investigations.  
Zeroing refers to the practice of replacing the actual amount of dumping that yield 
negative dumping margins with a value of zero prior to the final calculation of a weighted 
average margin of dumping for the product under investigation with respect to the 
exporters under investigation.  Zeroing drops transactions that have negative margins and 
hence increases the overall dumping margins and the resulting size of the applied 
antidumping duty.  As we will show zeroing makes it extremely difficult for a firm to avoid 
dumping.  This makes zeroing a major irritant to exporters but highly desired by import-
competing industries  
Over the past decade the WTO Appellate Body (AB) has heard more than a dozen 
disputes involving zeroing and each time has found that the practice violates the WTO 
                                            
3 Wilson (2007) notes that the respondent country has eventually brought itself into compliance in 
the vast majority of WTO disputes that have resulted in adverse Panel and Appellate Body rulings. Bown 
and Pauwelyn (2010) provide a collection of research examining the WTO dispute settlement process for the 
roughly dozen cases over the 1995 – 2007 period that resulted in at least a period of noncompliance and thus 
WTO Article 22.6 arbitration rulings that authorized formal retaliation by the complainants. Examples of 
such disputes include Brazil – Aircraft Subsidies (Canada), Canada – Aircraft Subsidies (Brazil), EC – 
Bananas (Ecuador), EC – Bananas (U.S.), EC – Hormones (Canada), EC – Hormones (U.S.), U.S. – 
Antidumping Act of 1916 (EC), U.S. – Continuing Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) 
(Brazil, Canada, Chile, EC, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico), U.S. – Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC) (EC), U.S. 
–  Internet Gambling (Antigua and Barbuda), and U.S. – Upland Cotton (Brazil). 
– 3 – Antidumping Agreement (ADA).4  The first zeroing case was initiated by India in 1998 
against the EC (EC – Bed Linen). 5  All but one of the remaining cases has involved the 
U.S. as respondent. The EC changed its antidumping procedures after losing at the WTO 
and no longer “zeros.”  The U.S., by contrast, has not yet fully complied with the WTO 
decisions and many WTO AB cases involving the U.S.’s zeroing practice remain 
unresolved.   
The WTO’s current inability to resolve the zeroing issue is reminiscent of the 
enforcement problems that plagued the GATT dispute system.  While the DSU may be 
working more or less as designed, is the zeroing issue a first indication that the WTO DSU 
must be reformed? Put differently, is zeroing an issue that could be better resolved 
through multilateral negotiations? If so, who should be at the negotiating table and what 
is at stake? 
This paper presents a positive analysis seeking to provide some perspective on the 
zeroing issue.  How did we get here?  What exactly is zeroing?  Why was the EC able to 
stop zeroing but not the U.S.?  Are developing country exporters also exposed to zeroing?  
To date zeroing disputes have been dominated by developed countries – not only on the 
respondent side, but also on the complainant side.  Should we expect a blizzard of zeroing 
complaints filed by developing countries? Even if the disputes fail to arise, is there 
evidence that zeroing impacts exports from developing countries as much as those from 
                                            
4 At least four more cases involving zeroing are pending AB decisions.  
5 Janow and Staiger (2003) and Grossman and Sykes (2006) provide an analysis of a variety of legal-
economic issues associated with the first zeroing dispute of EC – Bed Linen. See also Crowley and Howse 
(2010) which examines the zeroing issues in U.S. – Stainless Steel (Mexico). 
– 4 – developed countries?  Finally, we will try to get a better sense of zeroing’s importance.  Is 
it a “big” issue?  Or perhaps is this whole mess over zeroing – with apologies to William 
Shakespeare – much ado about nothing?     
Anticipating our conclusions, we find that a unique set of characteristics have 
conspired to make zeroing such a bothersome issue.  The WTO legislative history and 
technical nature of the zeroing violation likely contributes to the U.S.’s feeling that its 
current policy is in compliance.  The U.S.’s retrospective duty collection system 
complicates the task of complying with the WTO AB decisions.  By contrast, the 
prospective nature of the EC’s duty collection system made zeroing a much less 
economically important issue, explaining why it was relatively easy for the EC to comply.   
U.S. intransigence alone does not explain why zeroing consumes so much of the 
WTO dispute settlement caseload, which thus serves to heighten the political sensitivity to 
the issue.  The U.S. has antidumping duties on thousands of companies, on hundreds of 
separate products, and on more than 50 different WTO members.  Given that the U.S. 
“zeros” in every AD margin review calculation, the scope of the potential violation is 
enormous.  The WTO AB could become a full-time zeroing body!6 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of the 
economic relevance of the zeroing issue in the context of the U.S. antidumping caseload. In 
                                            
6 It also should be mentioned that the AB may have inadvertently exacerbated the issue of a high 
volume of zeroing-related cases through its initial choice of addressing zeroing in a piecemeal fashion. Bown 
and Sykes (2008) describe the implications of the AB’s narrow and iterative approach to ruling on zeroing, 
comparing it to a more expansive approach that might have clarified the full scope of permissibility and 
impermissibility of zeroing across all of the procedures of the antidumping process in which it might be used. 
– 5 – section 3 we more formally introduce antidumping and zeroing, and we identify how key 
factors such as export price volatility are likely to accentuate the impact of zeroing on the 
calculation of dumping margins. Section 4 then reviews the WTO dispute settlement 
caseload over the zeroing issue. We describe in detail the U.S.’s retrospective system for 
assessing antidumping margins and the impact that this has on zeroing in section 5. 
Section 6 focuses on the existing evidence of impact of the zeroing methodology on 
dumping margins. Section 7 provides our own empirical evidence into the question of 
zeroing’s impact, and we find that zeroing is as likely to impact the AD margins on 
developing country exports (which has typically not been brought forward to WTO dispute 
settlement) as AD margins on developed economy exports (which has frequently been 
brought to the DSU). Finally, section 8 concludes.  
 
2.  The Economic Relevance of Zeroing 
Whether zeroing is a “big” or “small” issue depends on one’s perspective as well as 
recognition of the likely policy alternatives in a world without zeroing.  Let’s begin by 
discussing some factors that suggest that zeroing is a major trade issue.    
Scope – Number of cases:  In Figure 1 we provide one measure of U.S. AD 
activity.  Here we plot the number of products affected by U.S. AD actions since 1990.7  
The solid line depicts the stock of products under order while the dashed line shows the 
                                            
7 In this figure we follow the common practice of using the 8-digit tariff line to define what 
constitutes a product. 
– 6 – number of new products being investigated in each year.  As shown, U.S. Department of 
Commerce (USDOC) currently has orders on more than 400 products.  The dashed line 
reveals that about 75 products are subject to new investigations each year, though with 
fluctuations broadly consistent with macroeconomic fluctuations (Knetter and Prusa, 
2003).  This means that in addition to the large stock of products that have been “zeroed” 
many new additional WTO zeroing violations are likely occurring each year. 
Moreover, given that most products are exported by multiple firms and by multiple 
countries these numbers are likely a lower bound on the number of potential zeroing 
complaints.  This raises the real possibility that the U.S. (and the WTO AB) could 
potentially be confronted with hundreds of zeroing disputes. 
 

















Source: Compiled by the authors from Bown (2010a). The stock is computed on a yearly basis as the number of 8-digit 
Harmonized System (HS) products subject to U.S. preliminary and/or final AD measures. The flow is computed on a 
yearly basis as the number of 8-digit HS products subject to U.S. AD investigations, some of which may not result in a 
duty. Since the data relies on the HS system, the stock does not reflect any imposed or removed AD measures that were 
imposed before 1988 under the TSUSA product classification system. 
 
Scope – Countries Affected: Despite a dispute settlement history which has 
mainly entailed industrialized countries challenging the U.S.’s use of zeroing in AD cases, 
there is every reason to believe that zeroing is just as important for developing country 
exporters. First, developing countries are increasingly affected by U.S. AD. In Figure 2 we 
report the stock of U.S. AD measures in effect for each year from 1990 through 2009.  In 
this chart we include information both for the products and also the exporting country.  
We divide the exporting countries into three groups: developed countries, China, and other 
– 8 – (non-China) developing countries.8    The information in Figure 2 indicates that over 60% 
of the stock of products covered by U.S. AD orders in place between 2006 and 2009 were on 
exports sourced from developing countries, more than doubling the share of total products 
affected at the onset of the WTO in 1995. The stock of measures affecting developing 
country exports has been increasing over time, as exports from many emerging economies 
have continued to expand.9  Looking forward, it is reasonable to think that this emerging 
pattern of AD measures involving developing countries will also be seen in the pattern of 
zeroing complaints at the WTO AB. Even though developing countries have currently only 
filed a few complaints challenging the practice, in all likelihood if the U.S. continues its 
non-compliance stance there will be more and more zeroing cases against the U.S., 
especially given that the AB’s position toward zeroing is well established. 
 
                                            
8 We break out China separately due to the heavy incidence of AD cases against it (Bown, 2010c). 
9 Note that it is notoriously difficult to compute estimates of the incidence of trade barriers such as 
antidumping, thus here we address this not by attempting to construct a measure in value terms but instead 
by examining the count of 8-digit Harmonised System (HS) and exporter combinations subject to U.S. AD 
measures.  On a value-weighted basis, it is likely that a larger share of the incidence of the stock of U.S. AD 
activity falls on developed economy exports, given the larger dollar values associated with their trade. 
Separately, it should also be noted that while the U.S. frequently uses AD to restrict imports from middle 
income economies such Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey, the U.S. has 
typically not used AD to restrict imports sourced from low income economies, with the exception of Vietnam.  



















Source: Compiled by the authors from Bown (2010a). The stock is computed on a yearly basis as the number of 8-digit 
Harmonized System (HS) product-exporter combinations subject to U.S. preliminary and/or final AD measures. Since the 
data relies on the HS system, the stock does not reflect any imposed or removed AD measures that were imposed before 
1988 under the TSUSA product classification system. 
 
Impact and Incidence: To date, the best evidence we have suggests that were the 
U.S. to stop zeroing then perhaps as much as half of all U.S. AD measures would be 
removed and the duties in the other cases would fall significantly.  Our analysis also 
suggests that dumping margins calculated, and hence duties imposed on developing 
countries, are as likely to be affected by zeroing as those imposed on developed countries.  
As we will explain, zeroing particularly punishes suppliers with export price variation.  
We collect import pricing data for a number of the biggest AD disputes over the past 
decade (many of which were the basis for WTO zeroing complaints) and review the price 
– 10 – volatility for developed and developing countries.  We find that developing countries have 
about the same price variation and hence their AD duties are likely to be similarly 
affected by zeroing.   
While zeroing is likely to impact developing country exporters and may lead to 
escalating tensions through WTO dispute settlement, there are other factors suggesting 
that zeroing may be less important than the above discussion indicates.  
Antidumping and WTO AB:  First, when it comes to dispute settlement, a broad 
and general point is simply that WTO disputes over AD are highly likely to continue to 
occur for reasons that have nothing to do with zeroing.  Bown (2009, p. 80) estimates that 
over the 2001-2008 period, more than 30% of the entire WTO dispute initiation caseload 
involved challenges to just two policies: antidumping or countervailing duties, 
antidumping’s sister “unfair trade” policy.10  Much of this caseload of AD challenges 
confronted other countries’ (and the U.S.’s) use of AD, let alone the issue of zeroing.   
Despite the large number of disputes involving zeroing one must remember that zeroing 
has been an issue in less than half of the AD cases appealed to the WTO.  Even if there 
were no disputes involving zeroing, a large fraction of the WTO AB’s workload would still 
involve antidumping and countervailing duty issues. 
                                            
10 Only 15% of the dispute caseload during the WTO’s first six years in existence (1995-2000) related 
to antidumping or countervailing duties. While a large share of the DSU caseload does involve challenges to 
many countries’ use of antidumping, this is not to imply that most imposed AD measures get challenged 
through the DSU. In fact, it is quite the opposite. Bown (2009, p. 82) estimates that fewer than 7% of the 
total WTO membership’s antidumping investigations that resulted in (more than 1600) imposed measures 
over the 1995-2008 period faced formal challenges through dispute settlement. Nevertheless this figure is 
much higher for the United States; Bown and Crowley (2010) note that almost 21% (27 out of 130) of the 
U.S. antidumping measures imposed against WTO members over the 1997-2006 period were challenged 
through formal dispute settlement, including a number via the zeroing cases we describe below. 
– 11 – There are a number of reasons why WTO disputes challenging AD frequently occur.  
Perhaps the most important explanation is the simple fact that the basic use of AD import 
restrictions has increased over time and across the WTO membership (Prusa, 2001).11  
Dozens of economies now have in place thousands of AD orders, and they are imposed and 
removed with great frequency. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that AD will go away any time 
soon, as most of the largest WTO members have adopted the policy and appear to 
appreciate its flexibility, for better or for worse. This is especially apparent in light of the 
global economic crisis of 2008-2010 in which many WTO members increased their use of 
the policy (Bown, 2010b), and yet this increased AD activity did not result in a massive 
and global protectionist backlash.   
Trade Cost: Despite AD frequently being used in the U.S., the total value of trade 
affected by AD (let alone zeroing) may be relatively small.12   Furthermore, any single 
country subject to U.S. AD actions likely has a similar fraction of its exports affected.  In 
many cases the elimination of zeroing would just reduce the margin, not eliminate the 
order, which means the impact of zeroing on the amount of trade affected is considerably 
smaller than the impact of AD.  The small dollar value involved is likely one reason why 
the specter of retaliation apparently has not induced the U.S. to alter its policy.  
                                            
11 Bown (2009) discusses a number of other reasons contributing to why AD is a frequent subject of 
WTO disputes, including the transparency of the policy and because it does not require political coordination 
of adversely affected firms and hence has fewer free rider problems than those facing exporting firms subject 
to many other sorts of trade barriers.  
12 The issue is unresolved and two recent papers even provide different interpretations of the 
estimated impact of AD on trade flows. Vandenbussche and Zanardi (forthcoming) argue that the costs of AD 
are larger than generally recognized because it depresses overall bilateral trade, whereas Egger and Nelson 
(forthcoming) provide evidence that the impact on overall trade is small. 
– 12 – The Alternative Policy:  Suppose zeroing were eliminated and this policy change 
resulted in significantly less use of antidumping by the U.S.  Would this mean U.S. 
imports would be subject to a lot less protection?  Perhaps not.  More likely is that some 
new type of protection would emerge.   What would be the alternative to antidumping?  
Given that countries appear to desire access to flexibility with their trade policy and the 
historical evidence of episodes in which there is “some” political-economy need to for some 
form of discretionary import protection, AD may be less worrisome economically than 
many other scenarios that might emerge.   
 
3.  Antidumping and Zeroing: The Theory 
If a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally charges in 
its own home market, it is said to be “dumping” the product.  If in addition the dumped 
imports are found to be causing, or threatening to cause, material injury to the competing 
domestic industry the WTO ADA allows governments to take action against dumping.  
The ADA contains rules that define how AD remedies should be implemented.13  Of 
particular relevance for our discussion, the ADA states that the antidumping duty (ADD) 
can be no greater than the calculated dumping margin.  In simplest terms a dumping 
margin of, say, 5%, means that on average the export price is 5% lower than the average 
home market price.  The size of the dumping margin is therefore crucial, determining both 
if there is a right to levy the duty and also the size of the duty. 
                                            
13 Blonigen and Prusa (2003) provide a survey of the economic research literature on antidumping. 
– 13 – In the process of computing the ADD a government must aggregate the results of 
comparisons between the normal value and export prices.  Hundreds or even thousands of 
individual transactions are aggregated to produce a single ADD.  The ADA provides rules 
for how such calculations should be done.  Zeroing refers to one particular step in the 
calculation.  Zeroing is the practice of replacing the actual amount of dumping that yield 
negative dumping margins (i.e., export transactions for which the export price exceeds the 
calculated normal value) with a value of zero prior to the final calculation of a weighted 
average margin of dumping for the product under investigation with respect to the 
exporters under investigation.  Because the zeroing method drops transactions that have 
negative margins, it has the effect of increasing the overall dumping margins.14   
In practice zeroing is much easier to understand than the formal definition 
suggests.  In Table 1 we present an example of a foreign firm’s home and export sales in a 
given month.15  We assume that the data in Table 1 represent net prices for separate 
transactions on a series of dates in the month of September.16  To keep the example as 
simple as possible we will assume that each transaction is for the same volume, i.e., one 
unit.  Governments compute dumping margins on a weighted average basis, but for the 
purposes of our illustration, the introduction of different quantities on different dates just 
                                            
14 There are two zeroing methods, simple and model.  For purposes of this paper, we limit our 
discussion to just simple zeroing.  Readers interested in the fine details of both methods should consult 
Prusa and Vermulst (2009). 
15 Example is drawn from Prusa and Vermulst (2009). 
16 Net prices are the exporter’s prices following a series of adjustments.  For example all expenses 
incurred to promote, sell, store, and transport the products are deducted from both export price and domestic 
price.  In addition, various other adjustments, such as level of trade and accounting for physical differences 
are made. 
– 14 – serves to complicate the computations – and needless complication is a primary reason 
why AD is so misunderstood. 
As seen, prices vary from transaction to transaction in both markets.  As is often 
the case in the real world, on some dates the export price is below the home market price, 
on others the export price is above the home market price and occasionally, the same price 
is charged in both the markets. 
Under ADA rules a government can calculate the difference in price on a 
transaction-by-transaction basis and then compute the weighted average of these price 
differences, i.e., the individual export transactions are compared with the individual 
domestic transactions made at or at about the same date as the export transactions 
concerned.17 
In column (4) of Table 1 we compute the difference for each comparable transaction.  
Accordingly, for some comparisons the difference is positive (which means dumping) and 
for other comparisons it is negative.  When we sum the weighted price differences we find 
that for all comparable transactions the cumulative difference is zero.  Said differently, 
the dumping amount (35) for the two transactions with positive dumping is exactly equal 
to the amount (-35) for the five transactions with negative dumping.  In this example, as 
long as the dumped and the non-dumped export transactions are allowed to offset each 
                                            
17 There are three common methods for calculating dumping margins: (i) a weighted average-to-
weighted average comparison, (ii) a transaction-to-transaction basis, and (iii) a weighted average-to-
transaction comparison.  Zeroing has been used in all methods.  For simplicity, we will just discuss zeroing 
in the context of the transaction-to-transaction approach.  Prusa and Vermulst (2009) discuss all three 
methods. 
– 15 – other, the conclusion using the transaction-to-transaction method will be that there is zero 
dumping. 
As clean and simple as the above calculations are, the U.S. has had a long practice 
of not computing the margins as described.  Instead, in the process of the transaction-to-
transaction comparisons the U.S. employs the practice of zeroing.  In our example, and in 
fact in most “real world” cases, the use of zeroing leads to dramatically different margins.  
To see this, in column (5) of Table 1 we have computed the difference for each comparable 
transaction using zeroing.  Each of the five negative margins is set to zero.  In our 
example, the amount of dumping is 35, which implies a dumping margin of 3.9% (35 
divided by the total export value of 900 = 0.039).18   
 
                                            
18 We note that this approach as adopted by the U.S. does however include all comparable 
transactions in the denominator (even though it zeroes many transactions in the numerator).  
– 16 – Table 1 – An Example of Zeroing 










2-Sep 75  90 15  15 
4-Sep 75  95 20  20 
8-Sep 95  95  0  0 
10-Sep 100  95  -5 0 
12-Sep 105  95  -10  0 
16-Sep 105  105  0 0 
18-Sep 110  105  -5 0 
20-Sep 115  110  -5 0 
24-Sep 120  110 -10  0 
Wtd Avg. 
Price 
100 100     
Dumping 
Value 
   0  35 
Dumping 
Margin 
   0.0%  3.9% 
 
Four important insights are gleaned from this example.  First, zeroing can never 
lower the margin.  Zeroing only drops negative margins.  Second, zeroing treats some 
foreign prices as if they were something different than they actually were.  On both 
September 12th and 16th the foreign firm charged $105 but a government using zeroing 
could treat the September 12th price as if it were just $95.  Third, zeroing is driven by price 
variation over the sample period.  If the foreign firm charged exactly the same price for all 
transactions then zeroing would not matter.19  Fourth, zeroing can be the difference 
between no dumping (or a de minimis margin) and a positive dumping margin; i.e., 
whether an antidumping duty is applied at all. 
                                            
19 This statement can be generalized to account for “model” zeroing zeroing (Prusa and 
Vermulst, 2009). 
– 17 – We elaborate on the last two insights in Figure 3 and Figure 4.  In Figure 3 we 
provide examples of hypothetical pricing data where zeroing does not change the ADD.  In 
the figure we provide two different pricing scenarios over a 12 month period.  In both cases 
we assume the foreign firm’s home market price is constant at $100.20  In Scenario A 
(dashed line, square markers) we consider a case when the foreign firm always charges an 
export price higher than $100.  There is month-to-month variation but there is no 
dumping in any month.  In Scenario B (dash-dot line, triangle markers) we depict the 
polar opposite situation.  In this case the foreign firm always charges a lower export price 
than the comparable home market price.  In this case the month-to-month pricing 
variation does not generate any potential offsetting margins. 
 



















                                            
20 Alternatively, $100 could be the average home market price over the period. 
– 18 –  
Figure 4 depicts the more typical situation.  We again assume the foreign firm’s 
home market price is constant at $100.  We now assume that in some months the foreign 
firm’s export price is above $100 and in other months below $100.  The firm’s actual export 
prices are depicted by the dashed line and solid diamond markets.21    With zeroing the 
government treats the foreign firm’s prices as if they instead looked like dashed-dotted 
line with hollow diamond markers.  In January, for example, a government practicing 
zeroing would act as if the foreign firm’s price were $100 instead of $135. 
 




















                                            
21 As with the example given in Table 1, without zeroing the actual export prices in Figure 4 would 
generate no dumping margin. 
– 19 – As these examples show, zeroing makes it extremely difficult for a firm to avoid 
dumping.  In January through May the foreign firm was making pricing decisions with no 
knowledge that those prices would be treated as something far different by the 
investigating foreign government.  Unless a firm’s export prices are always high or low 
(relative to some home market benchmark) zeroing combined with price variation will 
generate dumping margins.  Moreover, the reasons for the price variation – seasonality, 
exchange rates, variations in freight costs over time, etc. – are irrelevant.  In some cases, 
the product could be sold pursuant to a long-term contract which might mean no price 
variation and hence zeroing might not matter.  In other cases, the product could be sold on 
a spot basis which could mean heightened price variation.   
Price variation significantly affects the extent to which zeroing impacts the 
dumping margin.  All else equal, zeroing will have a larger impact for products with 
greater price variation.  To see this, we will now compute dumping margins across 
distributions with different variation but holding the average price constant.22  We 
assume the average export price is $100 in each scenario. 
We begin by supposing export prices are uniformly distributed between plow and 
phigh.23  In the first scenario we will assume that the weighted average home market price 
is $100.24  Hence if there were no zeroing the AD margin would be 0%.  With zeroing, 
                                            
22 Nye (2009) also points out that price volatility affects the zeroing distortion. 
23 For a uniform distribution the average price is (phigh - plow)/2 and the standard deviation is  
(phigh - plow)/12^(1/2). 
24 For simplicity, assume one unit is sold at each transaction. 
– 20 – however, prices greater than $100 will be treated “as if” they were just $100.  The extent 
of the zeroing impact depends on how much prices are adjusted; the greater the variation, 
the greater the adjustment.  In Figure 5 we show the dumping margins as a function of 
different levels of price variation.  The solid line depicts the ADD with zeroing.  As shown, 
price deviation as little as 5% will generate margins in excess of the de minimis level.25 
In the second scenario we consider a starker example of the impact of zeroing; here 
we assume the weighted average home market price is $90.  In other words, in this 
scenario the average export price ($100) exceeds the home market price by 11%.   Yet, as 
depicted by the dashed line, with zeroing a moderate amount of price deviation will again 
generate significant AD margins. 
 
                                            
25 For administrative reviews the U.S. imposes a de minimis margin of 2%. 











































In the third scenario we consider a more extreme case when the weighted average 
home market price is $75.  In this scenario the average export price ($100) exceeds the 
home market price by 33%.   Yet, zeroing combined with price deviation will nonetheless 
generate AD margins. 
Two lessons emerge from these three scenarios. First, we see that as the degree of 
over-selling increases (i.e., the bigger is the difference between the average  export price 
and the average home market price), the greater is the required price variation before non 
de minimis AD margins are created.  Second, despite substantially higher export prices, 
zeroing can produce positive dumping. 
The positive relationship between price variation and zeroing is quite general.  In 
Figure 6 we depict dumping margins with zeroing for three different distributions of 
– 22 – export prices: uniform, normal, and bimodal normal.  As we did with the first scenario in 
Figure 5 we restrict the export prices so that that average is $100; this means there would 
be a zero dumping margin without zeroing.  As shown this is not the case with zeroing.  
For all three distributions the dumping margin increases with the pricing variation. 
 












































There are two key takeaways from this discussion.  First, export characteristics that 
are associated with greater price variation will tend to be more seriously affected by 
zeroing.  These characteristics could be associated with the product (e.g., seasonality, 
volatile input prices), the exporting firm or industry (e.g., more or less competitive), or 
exporting country (e.g., exchange rate regime).  
– 23 – Second, volatility will play a significant role in assessing whether zeroing is as 
relevant for developing countries as it has been for developed countries.  As we will discuss 
in the following section to date most of the WTO cases involving zeroing were initiated by 
developed countries.  One possible explanation for this is that zeroing does not affect 
developing country exports.  Later in the paper we review export price volatility and our 
results suggest this is not likely the case.  Consequently, the lack of zeroing cases 
involving developing countries most likely is explained by other reasons (e.g., 
unwillingness to increase trade tensions with the U.S., inexperienced legal staff, etc.). 
 
4.  WTO Disputes Involving Zeroing 
There are four stages in the WTO dispute resolution system.26  The first is the 
consultation phase where the two complaining and respondent countries meet and 
attempt to negotiate a resolution.  If they are unable to do so, they can request a “Panel” to 
hear the evidence (the second phase).  Other WTO members with an interest in the 
dispute can join the process at this stage as an “interested third party.”  The Panel hears 
the evidence and issues a legal ruling.  If either of the primary countries is unhappy with 
any aspect of the Panel’s rulings it can appeal the case to the WTO’s Appellate Body (the 
third phase).   After reviewing the case and hearing arguments from the parties the 
Appellate Body will issue its final decision.  At that point if a country’s policy has been 
found to in violation of its WTO obligations, it is supposed to bring its policy into 
                                            
26 For a detailed description of the legal process, see Mavroidis (2007, pp. 398-445). 
– 24 – compliance.  If the complaining party is unhappy with the compliance it can request a 
Compliance Panel to rule on whether the respondent country has actually lived up to the 
AB’s rulings (the fourth phase).  If it has not, the AB can authorize the complainant to 
retaliate against the respondent, usually in the form of higher tariffs. 



















U.S. ‐ Carrier Bags (Thailand)  383  2008 Argentina, Chinese Taipei, EC, Japan, Korea  Y ‐‐‐
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U.S. ‐ Continued Zeroing (EC)  350  2006 Brazil, Chinese Taipei, China, Egypt, India, 
Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Thailand 
Y Y
































244  2002 Brazil, Chile, EC, India, Korea, Norway  N Y
EC ‐ Pipe Fittings (Brazil)  219  2000 Chile, Japan, Mexico, U.S.  Y Y
EC ‐ Bed Linen (India)  141  1998 Japan, Korea, U.S. Y Y
a  Unavailable / Pending  
b  The Panel’s zeroing decision was not appealed to the AB.  
 
Source: Compiled by the authors from information on the WTO website. 
– 25 –  
In Table 2 we list all WTO AB disputes that have involved zeroing.  Between the 
first zeroing dispute of 1998 and early 2010, of the more than 260 disputes initiated 
during that time period nearly 20 disputes have involved zeroing.27   Furthermore, while 
60% of all WTO disputes are resolved at the consultation phase this has not been the case 
for any zeroing disputes.  As a result, zeroing accounts for a greater share of Panel and AB 
time than the above statistics suggest.   Zeroing has been the subject of more than 13% of 
all WTO Panel investigations (phase 2) and almost 20% of all WTO AB reports (phase 3).  
It is quite likely that the WTO Appellate Body has devoted more time to zeroing than any 
other single issue in the WTO.   
The number of separate Panel and AB decisions that have found the practice of 
zeroing to be inconsistent with the ADA is noteworthy.  By our accounting, there have 
been at least 22 separate decisions finding the practice of zeroing to be inconsistent with 
the ADA (11 Panel, 11 AB).  Several comments about these decisions are warranted.   
First, there has been some tension between the Panels and the AB.  At least twice 
the Panels have sent mixed messages about zeroing.  In two cases, U.S. - Stainless 
Steel (Mexico) and U.S. - Zeroing (Japan), the Panel ruled that zeroing in original 
investigations was inconsistent but zeroing in review proceedings was consistent.28  The 
                                            
27 Five of the cases are pending AB decisions.  Zeroing was only a minor issue in several disputes.  
However, in most of the aforementioned disputes zeroing was the focal issue being adjudicated. 
28 Adding more confusion, in U.S. - Continued Zeroing (EC) the Panel stated their sympathy with the 
U.S. position but determined zeroing inconsistent only because of prior AB rulings.  
– 26 – Panels’ rationale hinged on their reading of Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement which 
states that  
the existence of margins of dumping during the investigation 
phase shall normally be established on the basis of a comparison 
of a weighted average normal value with a weighted average of 
prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison 
of normal value and export prices on a transaction-to-
transaction basis. A normal value established on a weighted 
average basis may be compared to prices of individual export 
transactions if the authorities find a pattern of export prices 
which differ significantly among different purchasers, regions or 
time periods, and if an explanation is provided as to why such 
differences cannot be taken into account appropriately by the 
use of a weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-
transaction comparison. (emphasis added) 
 
The Panels agreed with the U.S.’s contention that the phrase “during the 
investigation phase” limits the applicability to the original investigation not to any type of 
review proceeding.  However, in both cases the AB overturned the Panel and found that 
zeroing was inconsistent in both original investigations and reviews.   
The WTO AB has repeatedly determined that allowing zeroing in reviews but not in 
original investigations would lead to unequal treatment between prospective and 
retrospective duty systems. In the prospective system (used by most WTO members) the 
dumping margin is established on the basis of the original investigation.  In the 
retrospective system used by the U.S. the dumping margin calculated in the initial 
investigation only establishes the deposit rate. The actual dumping margin is established 
during an administrative review.   If the U.S.’s position held, then a country with a 
– 27 – retrospective system would be able to zero but a country with a prospective system (like 
the EC) would not. 
Second, the nature of the WTO’s jurisprudence has likely contributed to the number 
of disputes.  The practice of the Panels and AB has typically been to craft very narrow 
determinations in the attempt to reduce accusations of “judicial activism” and thus not 
limit infringement on member countries’ sovereign rights.  As a result, important issues 
are often left unaddressed for “judicial economy” which opens the door for the respondent 
country to limit the applicability of a ruling.  What the AB intended their decision to mean 
is often unclear until essentially the same issue is brought to the WTO DSU again (and 
again!).   With respect to zeroing, the judicial economy exercised by the AB in the initial 
cases meant that many issues (i.e., alternative methods of zeroing, appropriate use during 
different stages in a case) were not discussed.  This allowed the U.S. to interpret the early 
rulings very narrowly and resulted in more cases being filed (Bown and Sykes, 2008).  
Any ambiguity stemming from the AB’s piecemeal approach to decision-making 
should now be resolved in light of the recent decisions against zeroing.  The first few cases 
challenging zeroing made claims just against the use of zeroing in original investigations 
as applied in specific cases.  However, more recent cases – U.S. - Continued Zeroing (EC), 
U.S. - Zeroing (Japan), and U.S. - Zeroing (EC) – the complainants made very expansive 
claims against the practice.  The WTO AB’s decisions now imply that the practice of 
zeroing is inconsistent except under exceptional circumstances.   
– 28 – The number of countries complaining about the practice is also noteworthy.  In 
Table 3 we list the number of countries who have either initiated a WTO dispute involving 
zeroing (i.e., the “complainant”) or have filed supporting briefs as interested third parties.  
In total, 19 countries have been involved in zeroing disputes – 10 as complainant parties.  
 






















Source: Compiled by the authors from information on the WTO website. 
 
5.  U.S. Retrospective System and the Impact of Zeroing  
Despite the ongoing cases against it, the U.S. argues that it has complied with the 
WTO AB rules and that its practice is now consistent with the ADA.  The U.S. contends 
– 29 – that it has brought its policy into compliance in response to the initial WTO AB decisions 
against zeroing.  In January 2007 the USDOC decided to stop zeroing in original 
investigations.  The USDOC has not agreed, however, to stop zeroing in reviews.   This 
begs the question – why would the U.S. only take half-measures when resolving this trade 
issue?  We believe the answer is inextricably tied to the retrospective duty assessment 
system using by the U.S. 
Compare the EC and U.S. response to the WTO AB’s decisions regarding zeroing.  
As a general rule no WTO member happily accedes to dispute settlement decisions that go 
against their existing policies.  However, when the EC’s zeroing practice was found to be 
inconsistent with the WTO ADA, it fairly quickly changed its procedures to eliminate 
zeroing.  When the U.S.’s zeroing methodology was found to be inconsistent, the U.S. has 
been unable (or unwilling) to fully change its procedures.   
The duty assessment systems in the EC and U.S. partly explain why they 
responded differently to the WTO rulings.  Under the prospective duty assessment system 
used by the EC (and all other WTO members) the exporter is assigned a duty calculated 
on past pricing data and the duty applies to future transactions.  By contrast, under the 
U.S. retrospective system the AD duty imposed at the end of the original investigation 
only constitutes an estimate of the future liability.  The actual payment of AD duties will 
depend on the calculations made in the course of the annual administrative or duty-
assessment reviews.   
– 30 – Under either system zeroing will serve to increase margins.  It is fair to say that 
import-competing industries in both the EC and U.S. want zeroing because it serves to 
inflate the size of margins and hence leads to the imposition of larger import restrictions 
that shield them from foreign competition.  The difference, however, is that the impact of 
zeroing is amplified when used in a retrospective system.  Hence, the cost of eliminating 
zeroing in the U.S. is greater, thus increasing U.S. reluctance to abolish the practice. 
The retrospective system adds an element of uncertainty that is not present in the 
prospective system.  Under a prospective system an importer purchasing from an exporter 
under an AD order will know exactly the size of its extra duty.  Under a retrospective 
system, on the other hand, an importer purchasing from an exporter under an AD order 
only has an estimate of its extra duty.  It is conceivable the uncertainty could have as big 
an impact as the margin itself.  Suppose, for instance, the exporter is subject to a 5% duty 
and that duty exactly (or nearly) offsets her cost advantage relative to “nonsubject” 
suppliers – i.e., exporters which sell the same product in the U.S. market but that were 
not confronted with (subject to) the U.S. antidumping duty.  An importer might be 
unwilling to purchase from the exporter under order because of the possibility of a higher 
liability once the administrative review is conducted.   While uncertainty is inherent in the 
retrospective system, zeroing greatly compounds the phenomenon.  As shown in Figure 4 
the importer can have numerous purchases made during the period of review that are 
treated by the USDOC as if they were conducted at a different price than they actually 
were.  This makes importers even more reluctant to purchase from subject exporters.   
– 31 – As a result, U.S. import competing industries are much more opposed to eliminating 
zeroing than were EC import competing industries.  In turn, their strong opposition to 
reform makes it difficult for the USDOC to stop zeroing.  Said differently, the current U.S. 
compliance – stopping zeroing in original investigations – is essentially costless.  The de 
minimis dumping margin in original investigation is 0.5%.  In other words, if the home 
market price is $100 and the export price is $99.49 then the case will be allowed to 
proceed.  But, when the administrative review is conducted the exact same transactions 
would result in a larger dumping margin because of zeroing.  Thus, the real economic 
impact of zeroing – both in terms of the margin imposed and the uncertainty surrounding 
that margin – is driven by the review stage. 
 
6.  The Impact of Zeroing on Margins and Duties 
We now turn beyond the theory to the empirical question of the impact of zeroing on 
AD margins.29  Getting an accurate measure of the impact of zeroing on margins is 
difficult.  The fundamental problem is that the USDOC uses firm level pricing in both the 
home and export markets to calculate margins.  What we would like to do is compute the 
counterfactual “what if there were no zeroing” and then compare the counterfactual 
margin to the actual margin with zeroing.  The calculation of this counterfactual requires 
access to confidential firm-level pricing data and that is something we do not have.   We 
                                            
29 An important affect of zeroing is the additional uncertainty created for importers buying from 
subject suppliers.  We know of no empirical evidence on this latter impact so we will just focus on how 
zeroing affects the size of the margin. 
– 32 – do, however, have results from previous studies that did have access to such data and 
were able perform the counterfactual exercise. 
We begin by reviewing the result from what we believe is the only published study 
of zeroing that utilizes the same firm-level data as USDOC.  We then examine evidence of 
the impact of zeroing as contained in submissions to the WTO AB where countries submit 
the results of the counterfactual calculations. 
 
6.1 Firm-level  evidence 
The only published firm-level analysis of the impact of zeroing is contained in series 
of papers by the CATO Institute (Lindsey and Ikenson, 2002a, 2002b; Ikenson, 2004).  
Lindsey and Ikenson were able to get 18 firms from five different countries to share the 
exact pricing data they had submitted to the USDOC as part of their dumping 
investigations.  The determinations covered 14 original investigations and 
4 administrative reviews.  For each of these determinations, Lindsey and Ikenson used the 
USDOC’s own dumping calculation computer programs.  They first recreated the dumping 
margins determined by the USDOC.  They then altered those programs to gauge the effect 
of zeroing on margins.  They state 
Using actual case data and the DOC’s dumping calculation 
computer programs, it was possible to calculate the actual 
effects of zeroing in these particular cases. In 17 of the 18 
determinations, the dumping margin was inflated by zeroing. In 
5 of the cases, the overall dumping margin would have been 
negative. On average, the dumping margins in the 17 cases 
– 33 – would have been 86.41 percent lower if zeroing had not been 
employed.30 
 
Due to confidentiality issues, Lindsey and Ikenson are unable to report the actual 
size of the original dumping margin.  As a result we are unable to determine how great the 
86 percent reduction is – it could imply a change in the actual dumping margin of 2, 20 or 
even 50 percentage points.  While we don’t know the identity of the individual firms we do 
know what cases were involved (e.g., stainless steel bar from Germany) and we know the 
“all others” duty reported for each case.31   Using the “all others” duty we estimate that 
the Lindsey and Ikenson estimate of an 86.41 percent reduction due to zeroing implies 
that the average impact of zeroing is at least 17.50 percentage points – i.e., a change in the 
margin of dumping from 20.2 to 2.7 percent.   
Particularly noteworthy are Lindsey and Ikenson’s results with respect to reviews.  
Their results confirm that zeroing has a particularly powerful impact at the review phase.  
They had access to case data for just four review calculations and in each instance they 
found the margin was entirely driven by zeroing.  That is, without zeroing there would 
have been no margin.  Their results are consistent with the idea that firms subject to AD 
orders make an effort to comply with the dumping order but are ultimately bedeviled by 
the distortion created by zeroing – transactions that they thought would be treated as 
                                            
30 Ikenson (2004), p. 2. 
31 We note that the “all others” rate often does not necessarily correspond to any individual firm’s 
duty but is better thought of as the average margin for all firms involved in the case. 
– 34 – occurring at one price were assigned a lower price by USDOC which in effect creates 
margins. 
 
6.2   Evidence from WTO dispute documents 
While the Lindsey and Ikenson study is compelling, it involves a small sample of 
firms.  We have also reviewed the WTO disputes for evidence on the impact of zeroing.  We 
found reports of the impact of zeroing in the public documents for only three cases: U.S. - 
Stainless Steel (Mexico) (dispute 344), U.S. - Zeroing (Japan) (dispute 322), and U.S. - 
Zeroing (EC) (dispute 294).  From these three disputes we have information on the impact 
of zeroing for 74 separate margin calculations. 
The tabulation of the findings is given in Table 4.   For each margin calculation we 
report the name of the product under investigation, the name of the company subject to 
the investigation, and the AD duty as calculated by the USDOC (inclusive of zeroing).  For 
original investigations this is the final AD duty for each firm; for administrative reviews 
this is the duty margin actually imposed by USDOC.  In the final column we report the 
results of the counterfactual exercise – what the margin would have been if zeroing were 
not performed.  Given the individual firms’ sensitivities about revealing confidential 
pricing information, many times we do not know the exact “what if no zeroing” margin.  
Instead, the public documents often simply report “lower,” “negative,” or de minimis.  
“Lower” simply means the margin would have been lower but would have still been above 
the de minimis level; “negative” means the margin would have been negative (i.e., no 
– 35 – – 36 – 
dumping); de minimis means the margin would be positive but sufficiently small to be 
considered zero.  In either of this latter two cases the case would have been terminated (if 
an original investigation) or no duties would have been paid (if an administrative review).   
 – 37 – 










DS294 ‐  No. 2  (OI) Stainless Steel Bar from France Ugine‐Savoie Imphy  3.90% Negative
Aubert & Duval S.A  71.83% Lower















DS294 ‐  No. 6  (AR) Industrial Nitrocellulose from France Bergerac NC 3.26% Lower
DS294 ‐  No. 7  (AR) Industrial Nitrocellulose from the United Kingdom Imperial Chemical Industries 3.06% Negative
DS294 ‐  No. 8  (AR) Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium ALZ NV 3.84% Negative
DS294 ‐  No. 9  (AR) Certain Pasta from Italy Pastificio Guido Ferrara S.r.L 1.25% Lower
Pastificio Antonio Pallante S.r.L 1.78% Lower
PAM S.r.L. 4.10% de minimis
DS294 ‐  No. 10  (AR) Certain Pasta from Italy Pastificio Garofalo S.p.A 0.55% Lower
DS294 ‐  No. 11  (AR) Stainless Steel Sheet Strip in Coils from Italy Acciai Speciali Terni SpA 0.66% Negative
DS294 ‐  No. 12  (AR) Stainless Steel Sheet Strip in Coils from Italy Acciai Speciali Terni SpA 5.84% Negative
DS294 ‐  No. 13  (AR) Granular Polytetrafluoroenthylene Resin from Italy Ausimont SpA  2.15% Lower
DS294 ‐  No. 14  (AR) Granular Polytetrafluoroenthylene Resin from Italy Ausimont SpA  12.08% Lower
DS294 ‐  No. 15  (AR) Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from France Ugine 3.00% Negative






TKN  4.77%  Negative – 38 – 
 







DS294 ‐  No. 19  (AR) Ball Bearings from France SKF France SA and Sarma 8.51% Negative
DS294 ‐  No. 20  (AR) Ball Bearings from Italy SKF Industrie SpA  3.70% Negative
DS294 ‐  No. 21  (AR) Ball Bearings from United Kingdom FAG Italia SpA  1.42% Negative
NSK Bearings Europe Ltd 16.87% Negative
   Barden Corporation UK 3.87% Negative
DS294 ‐  No. 22  (OI) Stainless Steel Wire Rod  from Sweden Fagersta Stainless AB  5.71% Negative
DS294 ‐  No. 23  (OI) Stainless Steel Wire Rod  from Spain Roldán SA 4.73% Lower
DS294 ‐  No. 24  (OI) Stainless Steel Wire Rod  from Italy Cogne Acciai Speciali Srl 12.72% Lower
DS294 ‐  No. 25  (OI) Stainless Steel Wire Rod  from Belgium ALZ 3.84% Lower
DS294 ‐  No. 26  (OI) Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils  from France Usinor 9.38% Lower
DS294 ‐  No. 27  (OI) Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils  from Italy Acciai Spaciali Terni SpA 11.23% Lower



















































DS322 ‐  No. 11  (AR) Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Japan NSK Ltd. 6.07% Negative (‐18.78%)
Asahi Seiko Co., Ltd.  2.51% Negative (‐26.83%)
NTN Corporation  9.34% Negative (‐12.17%)
DS322 ‐  No. 12  (AR) Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Japan NTN Corporation  4.51% Negative (‐25.99%)
NSK Ltd. 2.68% Negative (‐29.90%)
DS322 ‐  No. 13  (AR) Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof From Japan Koyo Seiko Co., Ltd.  5.56% Negative (‐10.83%)
NTN Corporation  2.74% Negative (‐25.86%)
NSK Ltd. 2.46% Negative (‐29.61%)
DS344 ‐ No. 1  (OI) Stainless Steel from Mexico) ThyssenKrupp Mexinox S.A. de C.V.  30.85% Lower
DS344 ‐ No. 2  (First AR) Stainless Steel from Mexico  ThyssenKrupp Mexinox S.A. de C.V  2.28% Negative
DS344 ‐ No. 3  (Second AR)Stainless Steel from Mexico  ThyssenKrupp Mexinox S.A. de C.V  6.15% Lower (1.83%)
DS344 ‐ No. 4  (Third AR)Stainless Steel from Mexico  ThyssenKrupp Mexinox S.A. de C.V  7.43% Lower (4.96%)
DS344 ‐ No. 5  (Fourth AR)Stainless Steel from Mexico  ThyssenKrupp Mexinox S.A. de C.V  5.42% Lower (1.54%)
DS344 ‐ No. 6  (Fifth AR)Stainless Steel from Mexico  ThyssenKrupp Mexinox S.A. de C.V  2.96% Negative
 
a This column indicates what would have been the outcome if zeroing were not applied; “lower” simply means the margin would 
have been lower; “negative” means the margin would have been negative (i.e., no dumping) and as a result the case would 
have been terminated (for original investigations) or no duties would have been paid (for administrative reviews).  
“De minimis” means the margin is too small to be subject to an order. “OI” indicates original investigation whereas “AR” 
indicates administrative review. 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors from the public documents submitted as part of each AB dispute; case information available 
from the WTO website. In Table 5 we summarize the information reported in Table 4.  Without zeroing in 
30 instances the dumping margin would have been lowered and in 42 instances the 
margin would have been eliminated, i.e., a zero margin.  Said differently, more than 
half of the cases submitted to the WTO would have no dumping but for the practice of 
zeroing. 
 
Table 5 – WTO Disputes – Reported Impact of Zeroing (summary) 
Dumping margin lower  30 
Dumping margin eliminated  42 
Dumping margin change “N/A”  2 
Total cases  74 
Source: Compiled from the information in Table 4. 
One needs to be cautious extrapolating the statistics from the WTO AB cases to 
all U.S. AD activity.  There are two reasons why we are concerned that there is a 
possible selection issue which might result in the WTO AB evidence overstating the 
impact of zeroing.  First, the cases submitted to the WTO may have been selected 
precisely because they were particularly egregious examples of zeroing.  While we have 
no evidence for this, it is nevertheless a concern given the complainants desire to submit 
the most compelling cases to the WTO.   
Second, the cases chosen for WTO appeal might have lower margins and thus be 
more likely to have a zero margin if the practice of zeroing ceased.   There is some 
evidence that this is the case.  Using information from Bown (2010a), we compared the 
dumping margins for cases that were the basis for WTO zeroing complaints with all 
other U.S. AD cases.   The average margin for cases not brought to the WTO is 62.6% 
– 40 – while the average margin for cases that have been the basis for WTO zeroing 
complaints is 36.2%.32   This does not mean that the practice of zeroing has not affected 
the margins in the other cases, but it does suggest that the margins for most cases are 
not entirely driven by zeroing.   It also suggests that countries choose to file WTO 
appeal on cases where it is more likely that the elimination of zeroing could mean de 
minimis margins and the removal of antidumping duties altogether.   
The more robust finding is that the impact of zeroing is to increase the dumping 
margin.  In Table 6 we use the WTO disputes and calculate the impact on the margin 
due to zeroing.  On average, dumping margins would have been 12.3 percentage points 
lower.  While this is smaller than the Lindsey and Ikenson’s study estimates we note 
that it is greater than the average margin (10.5%) for these cases.   This is again 
compelling evidence that zeroing has a large and significant impact on margins.   
 
Table 6 – WTO Cases, Change in Margin Due to Zeroing 
(percentage point change) 
  Median Mean 
Cases where dumping margin was  
lowered but not eliminated 
3.9% 3.3% 
Cases where dumping margin was eliminated  7.2%  13.3% 
All cases  4.8%  12.3% 
Source: Compiled from the information in Table 4. 
 
 
                                            
32 The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
– 41 – If we focus just on the WTO cases in Table 4 that involve administrative reviews, 
we have a sample of 45 dumping margins.  Of this sample, in 35 of the 45 cases the 
margin would have been eliminated if zeroing were not employed.  If one is willing to 
assume that this is a representative statistic for other cases, the evidence from the 
current WTO jurisprudence suggests that about 75% of review margins would be 
eliminated but for zeroing.  This is consistent with the CATO study which also found 
the impact of zeroing at the review phase to be particularly significant. 
We again urge caution in applying the WTO AB statistics to the overall sample of 
U.S. antidumping cases.  As we discussed above, the margins for cases brought to the 
WTO AB are generally lower than those for other cases.  It may simply be the case that 
the low margin cases give the complaining country the “biggest bang for the buck” and 
therefore are more likely to result in WTO challenges.33 
Moreover, given that non-challenged cases tend to have higher margins, it is 
uncertain what the impact of zeroing is on the trade volumes.  That is, suppose the U.S. 
stopped zeroing in all cases.  The elimination of zeroing may result in lower margins but 
nevertheless have little impact on trade.  This would be the case, for instance, if the 
computed margin without dumping was still quite high.  Suppose a firm has a dumping 
margin with zeroing of 80% and its margin without zeroing was 35%.  It is not likely 
that a margin of 35% would result in a significantly different volume of imports than a 
margin of 80% – a duty can easily be prohibitive at 35%. 
                                            
33 Bown (2005) argues this selection issue applies more generally in WTO disputes. 
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7.  Likely Impact of Zeroing on Developing Countries 
Until relatively recently, most of the WTO disputes over zeroing had been 
dominated by cases initiated by developed economy complainants such as EC, Japan, 
and Canada.  While there have been a few cases involving developing country 
complainants, zeroing was a side issue in many of these cases.34   
Since 2008, however, a growing number of developing countries such as Vietnam, 
Korea, Thailand, and Brazil have initiated zeroing complaints at the WTO.  Can we 
expect other developing countries to also join the fray?  The answer would seemingly be 
“yes”.  First, the U.S. applies its practice of zeroing against all subject import suppliers.  
Every developing country with products subject to U.S. AD orders has had zeroing 
applied.   Second, as Figure 2 indicates, there are many developing country exports 
subject to current U.S. antidumping orders. This means there are many cases that could 
be the basis for a WTO complaint.  Third, and perhaps the most compelling reason why 
one should expect more zeroing cases, the WTO AB’s views on zeroing are now well 
established.  As discussed above, numerous decisions have been made against zeroing.   
Moreover, the most recent WTO decisions have clearly established the general 
inconsistency of zeroing and have responded to all criticisms by panels of the early 
zeroing decisions.  Given these decisions, it is hard to see how the U.S. could win any 
                                            
34 Disputes 206, 335, 343, and 345 all contained zeroing complaints but they were primarily about 
other procedures. 
– 43 – zeroing dispute at the WTO.  This reality will likely embolden other countries to initiate 
their own actions against the U.S. 
The key unknown is the extent that zeroing has a different impact on developed 
versus developing country margins.  If zeroing has a smaller impact on developing 
countries then arguably there is a smaller benefit of filing a costly WTO dispute.  This 
might be the case, for instance, if developing countries prices are consistently “low” or 
consistently “high” (e.g., as shown in Figure 3).  In these cases, even though zeroing is 
technically applied to the pricing data, it may not have any influence (or only a small 
impact) on the margin.  It could also be the case that import prices for developing 
countries were subject to less volatility than those for developed countries.  As shown in 
Figure 5, if this were the case then, all else equal, zeroing will have less of an impact on 
the ADD for countries with less price variation.   In these situations developing 
countries will have a smaller stake in a WTO dispute and hence be less compelled to 
initiate a dispute. Finally, and as discussed in the last section, it may also be the case 
that the counterfactual dumping margins applied in the absence of zeroing might still 
be so high so that the applied U.S. antidumping duty is still prohibitive – i.e., de facto, 
there is no positive trade-enhancing effect of eliminating zeroing from the dumping 
calculation.35 
                                            
35 Moreover, as Bown (2009) notes, in general the cost relative to benefits for developing countries 
to challenge the U.S. at the WTO might be higher than for developed countries.  Nevertheless, this does 
not appear to be much of an issue for potential developing country complainants when the trade barrier 
at issue is the trading partner’s use of antidumping, of which there are many disputes. Indeed, Bown 
(2009, table 6-6, p. 163) points out that with access to the Advisory Centre on WTO Law – which provides 
DSU legal assistance to developing country clients – there have been a number of disputes in which the 
imposed AD measure being challenged was restricting less than $3 million of trade per year.   
– 44 – This discussion suggests that it is possible that both the benefits and costs of 
WTO disputes may differ for developing countries, and as a result we might not see a lot 
of developing country-initiated zeroing disputes.  Because the failure to initiate a 
dispute is not clear evidence that there has been no harm, whether the U.S. zeroing 
process is also likely to adversely impact developing country exporters is therefore an 
empirical question. 
For our purposes we limit ourselves to the question of whether zeroing likely has 
a significant effect on any potential duty imposed on developing countries.  To get a 
sense of the possible extent of zeroing’s impact on developing countries we gathered 
U.S. import data for some of the most prominent products subject to U.S. ADD scrutiny 
over the past decade.36  Two factors influenced what products we included in our 
sample. First, we wanted to capture cases that were economically “important” for 
developing countries and were in products most likely to be subject to AD examination. 
Second, we wanted to focus on products where we had strong independent evidence that 
there had been a WTO zeroing violation.   With respect to the first criterion, we 
included cases where there was both significant AD activity and also substantial import 
supply by developing countries.  With respect to second criterion, we included products 
for which there already had been WTO disputes.     
Once we selected the products to review, we then calculated the monthly price 
variation during the 12 months during the year prior to the filing of the case, a time 
                                            
36 List of cases included in the analysis is given in the appendix. 
– 45 – generally used by the USDOC in its ADD calculations.  Products were identified at the 
HTS 10 digit level.  To assist in comparability across the various products, we 
normalized the prices for each HTS product so that the mean price for each HTS 
product was 1 for the sample period.  With that normalization we then computed the 
pricing variation over the period.   
We used the World Bank’s country classification guide to divide countries 
according to their development status.37  We group countries designated by the World 
Bank as “Low income” and “Lower-middle income” as low income and those designated 
“Upper-middle income” and “High income” as high income.38   
We can use regression analysis to test for the statistical significance of the 
difference in price variation.  The OLS results for a linear specification are given in 
Table 7.  We also control for whether a supplying country was subject to the 
investigation in these regressions.   For each product, suppliers fall into one of four 
categories: (i) subject-high income; (ii) subject-low income; (iii) nonsubject-high income; 
and (iv) nonsubject low income.  All parameters are measured relative to the subject- 
high income countries; i.e., the economies filing the zeroing disputes against the U.S. at 
the WTO.  In Specification A we include just the basic controls; in Specification B we 
attempt to control for the possible correlation between price variation and price levels 
by also controlling for the general level of prices.  In this specification “low prices” (“high 
                                            
37 World Bank “WTI Country Classification by Region and Income, (July 2009-July 2010) “ at 
http://tinyurl.com/y494rao  
38 Most countries in our sample we call “low income” fall under the World Bank’s category “Lower 
middle income”. 
– 46 – prices”) correspond to exporters with prices at least 30% below (above) the average for 
the product.  The third category (“moderate prices”) denotes export prices within 30% of 
the average price.  In Specification B moderate and high price suppliers are measured 
relative to low price suppliers. 
 
Table 7 – OLS Regression: Month-to-Month Variation in Prices 
by Supplying Country 
 A  B 
Subject, Low Income    -0.164  0.026 
 [0.122]  [0.802] 
Nonsubject, High Income  0.379  0.331 
 [0.000]***  [0.000]*** 
Nonsubject, Low Income  0.197  0.341 
 [0.070]*  [0.001]*** 
“Moderate” prices    0.297 
   [0.000]*** 
“High” prices    1.174 
   [0.000]*** 
Constant 1.070  0.608 
 [0.000]***  [0.000]*** 
Observations 1,948  1,948 
Adjusted R-squared  0.021  0.105 
 
p values in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
The table reveals several interesting insights.  First, focus just on the subject 
suppliers that were confronted with the U.S. antidumping. The results indicate that 
there is no statistically significant difference in price variation for low income and high 
income countries.  In specification A the estimate is negative and in specification B the 
estimate is positive.  In both specifications the parameter estimates are statistically 
– 47 – insignificant.  This is important because it suggests price volatility for developing 
countries is comparable to that of developed countries, at least with respect to the 
products in our sample.  What does this mean for zeroing? Given many of products in 
our sample were the basis for WTO zeroing disputes, we know that zeroing has affected 
the margins for developed countries in the sample.  All else equal the similarity in price 
volatility makes it likely that zeroing has affected the margins and duties that the U.S. 
imposes on developing countries.   Thus, even though developing countries did not 
initiate the WTO disputes, they are quite likely affected by zeroing in the same way as 
the developed countries that did initiate the disputes.  Said differently, the results 
suggest that the lack of WTO activity is not a sign that zeroing is less relevant for 
developing countries. 
Second, both specifications show that price volatility for nonsubject suppliers is 
higher than for subject suppliers.  The parameter estimates are statistically significant 
in both specifications.  This suggests that the specter of zeroing also looms over 
nonsubject countries.  While they were not investigated in these cases, their price 
variation is greater than for firms that were investigated which makes it likely zeroing 
would have also affected their dumping margins.39   
Third, in specification B we control for the suppliers’ export price levels.  This is 
an attempt to capture some of the insights from our earlier discussion about the impact 
of price levels on zeroing.  While the estimates clearly show that higher volatility is 
                                            
39 One potential explanation for why the non-subject countries were not investigated is because 
they were not “dumping.” However, without any information on home market prices we cannot infer 
whether these suppliers are selling at less than fair value. 
– 48 – associated with higher price levels, the main results with respect to subject and 
nonsubject suppliers are consistent across both specifications.  
Overall, the results from this analysis indicate that developing countries have 
comparable price volatility as developed countries.  Thus, even though developing 
countries have not yet initiated many WTO disputes about zeroing, the pricing evidence 
suggests that their margins have been similarly affected by zeroing. 
 
8.  Concluding Comments 
Zeroing has emerged as a particularly irksome issue for all affected parties.  For 
the U.S. the numerous negative decisions fuel the belief in Congress that the WTO is 
biased and lessens U.S. support for the WTO. For U.S. trading partners, the U.S.’s non-
responsiveness to the zeroing decisions sends a signal that compliance is voluntary, and 
this effectively erodes the legitimacy of the WTO.  At one level, the WTO’s current 
inability to resolve the zeroing issue echoes of the enforcement problems that eroded 
support for the GATT dispute system in the 1980s.   
The evidence suggests a real possibility that developing countries will also soon 
begin filing WTO complaints over the U.S.’s use of zeroing.  First, WTO AB has now a 
long series of decisions striking down virtually all use of zeroing.40  This makes it far 
                                            
40 The AB decisions suggest that zeroing in response to “targeted dumping” is WTO consistent.  
What constitutes “targeted dumping” is unclear.  Recent actions by USDOC seem to indicate that the U.S. 
will try to use this exception in order to continue zeroing (e.g., zeroing was applied in the final 
– 49 – more likely that a developing country will prevail in a dispute against the U.S.  Second, 
the evidence indicates that the elimination of zeroing significantly reduces the AD 
margin.  This means there is potentially a large economic return to the filing dispute.  
Third, the empirical evidence implies that developing countries export prices are at 
least as volatile as developed countries.  This makes it likely that zeroing has affected 
developing country margins and thus the size of antidumping duties that their 
exporters face.  Fourth, at this point in time there is no clear sign that the U.S. is ready 
to stop zeroing.  This means that the WTO violations will remain unless pursued by the 
affected developing countries. 
All signs, therefore, point towards more WTO cases and more strain on the 
system.  We, however, do not believe the zeroing problem will be the ruin of the WTO 
DSU.  To a large extent, the WTO dispute mechanism is working as designed.  While 
complainant parties have every reason to be frustrated with the pace of compliance, the 
WTO dispute settlement process was designed to proceed at a somewhat ponderous 
pace.  As of early 2010, several cases are in or have just finished the Article 21.5 
compliance phase of the DSU.  As specified by the WTO Agreement, complainant 
parties will likely soon have the right to retaliate against U.S. trade to offset the 
damage due to zeroing.   
Much to the frustration of the other WTO members, the retaliation value will 
likely be quite small for most instances of violation.  For most countries and most 
                                                                                                                                                   
determination of sales at less than fair value in a recent case involving Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags 
from Taiwan, 75 Fed. Reg. 14569, Mar. 26, 2010).  
– 50 – products the value of trade subject to AD orders is quite small.  Even if half the orders 
are removed, the dollar value of current WTO decisions against the U.S. is likely 
insufficient to spur action by Congress.  While zeroing is consuming a large amount of 
AB time, the reality is that it might be too small a violation to induce a difficult policy 
change. 
The resolution to the zeroing issue may well be that the retaliatory claims 
against the U.S. – likely including many by developing countries – will have to continue 
to amass until the impact is sufficient enough to spur USDOC to changes its policy.  In 
effect, the large number of zeroing cases at the AB is one indicator that it is an 
economically small issue.   
Nevertheless, for the WTO itself, the growing number of very similar, 
unimplemented decisions against a prominent and powerful member challenges the 
stature of the institution. If the WTO cannot resolve something as simple as zeroing, 
how can any of its members hope the AB can help resolve truly complicated and 
politically charged issues like genetically modified organisms, intellectual property 
standards, agriculture reform, labor standards, or border tax adjustments for climate 
change?   From this perspective, it is in the WTO’s best interest to see the zeroing 
conflict resolved sooner rather than later. 
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Appendix: U.S. Antidumping Cases Used in Price Variation Analysis 
 
Product  Case ID (Bown, 2010) 
Ball Bearings  USA-AD-391a, USA-AD-392a, USA-AD-393a, USA-
AD-394a, USA-AD-399a 
Brass Sheet/Strip  USA-AD-317 
Certain Frozen and 
Canned Warmwater 
Shrimp and Prawns 
USA-AD-1063, USA-AD-1064, USA-AD-1065, USA-









USA-AD-829, USA-AD-830, USA-AD-831, USA-
AD-832, USA-AD-833, USA-AD-834, USA-AD-835, 




USA-AD-964, USA-AD-965, USA-AD-966, USA-
AD-967, USA-AD-968, USA-AD-969, USA-AD-970, 
USA-AD-971, USA-AD-972, USA-AD-973, USA-
AD-974, USA-AD-975, USA-AD-976, USA-AD-977, 
USA-AD-978, USA-AD-979, USA-AD-980, USA-
AD-981, USA-AD-982, USA-AD-983 
Corrosion-Resistant 




USA-AD-815, USA-AD-816, USA-AD-817, USA-










Hot Rolled Carbon 
Steel Flat Products 
USA-AD-806, USA-AD-807, USA-AD-808 
Hot-Rolled Carbon 
Steel Products 
USA-AD-898, USA-AD-899, USA-AD-900, USA-
AD-901, USA-AD-902, USA-AD-903, USA-AD-904, 
USA-AD-905, USA-AD-906, USA-AD-907, USA-
AD-908 
  
– 55 – – 56 – 
 
U.S. Antidumping Cases Used in Price Variation Analysis (continued) 
 





Oil Country Tubular 
Goods 
USA-AD-1000, USA-AD-1001, USA-AD-1002, USA-
AD-1003, USA-AD-1004, USA-AD-1005 
Oil Country Tubular 
Goods 
USA-AD-992, USA-AD-993, USA-AD-994, USA-





USA-AD-1084, USA-AD-1085, USA-AD-1086, USA-
AD-1087 
Spherical Plain Ball 
Bearings 
USA-AD-394e 
Stainless Steel Bar  USA-AD-913, USA-AD-914, USA-AD-915, USA-
AD-918 
Stainless Steel Plate in 
Coils 
USA-AD-788 
Stainless Steel Sheet 
and Strip 
USA-AD-797, USA-AD-798, USA-AD-799, USA-
AD-802 
Steel Concrete Rebar  USA-AD-878 
Tapered Roller 
Bearings 
USA-AD-343 
 
 